News & Reviews News Wire Missteps lead California high speed rail to crisis NEWSWIRE

Missteps lead California high speed rail to crisis NEWSWIRE

By Dan Zukowski | March 4, 2019

| Last updated on November 3, 2020

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SACRAMENTO, Calif. – “A new statewide train system, over 700 miles in length, capable of travel at speeds up to 200 mph,” reads a 2005 brochure published by the California High Speed Rail Authority. The system will “carry as many as 68 million passengers annually by 2020.” Those dreams are stalled somewhere in the arid San Joaquin Valley between the oil derricks of Bakersfield and the cattle ranches of Merced.

High speed rail connecting Los Angles and San Francisco has been an idea, long in coming, that began to take shape in 1996 with the creation of the agency. But it was not until 2008, when California voters approved Proposition 1A by a 53 to 47 percent majority, that real money was on the table to make it happen.

The bond measure provided $9 billion for the construction of an 800-mile, high speed rail system and $950 million for improvements to connecting passenger rail services. Major newspapers in Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, and Fresno came out in support of the proposal. Opposition came from Republican strongholds represented by the Orange County Register and San Diego Union-Tribune, along with the Sacramento Bee, which recoiled at adding to the state’s debt.

The authority’s first business plan, released in 2000, estimated total construction costs of $25 billion. By 2008, when voters approved Proposition 1A, it had grown to $33 billion. Today, the number ranges from $77 billion to $98 billion, three to four times the early estimate.

James Moore, director of the Transportation Engineering program at the University of Southern California and an admitted critic of the project, says the rail authority “put out financial plans that just crumble at the touch.”

The proposition put to voters was unusually detailed. It specified travel times between major city pairs and a total travel time from Los Angeles to San Francisco of two hours, 40 minutes. Trains must be capable of at least 200 mph speeds, no more than 24 stations can be served across the entire network, and the full system must be completed no later than 2020.

Those requirements posed a challenge for the agency, limiting its flexibility, says Adam Cohen, a researcher at the Berkeley Transportation Sustainability Research Center.

Of all the places to lay down 220-mph tracks, the 119 miles from Bakersfield to Merced would seem the least likely. The total population of the five counties is 2.6 million and the route is already served by Amtrak’s state-supported San Joaquin service. It was, however, designated as part of the Initial Operating Segment.

Cohen says the Central Valley is the optimum place to develop what amounts to a test track. If completed, riders would be able to reach San Francisco, although for now, would have no connecting or through train to the Los Angeles area.

Funding falls short
In addition to funding from Proposition 1A, the CHSRA relies on a share of revenues from California’s cap-and-trade program along with federal grants, which are now at risk of being rescinded.

Including the federal grants, the agency has the funding to complete the Central Valley segment. But it falls tens of billions of dollars short of completion costs for the full system.

Both construction costs and real estate have escalated since the 2007-2009 recession, explains Cohen. He also points out that the project has been “bogged down in cost-increasing litigation.”

Whatever the reason, Californians have seen ever-rising cost projections every few years. “When you do stuff like that to people, they feel like they’ve been duped,” says Lisa Schweitzer, a professor of urban planning at USC.

In 2018, a USC Dornsife/Los Angeles Times poll showed 49 percent of registered voters supporting the high speed rail project, but when told it would cost $77 billion, the same percentage said they would stop it. A separate 2018 poll by the Public Policy Institute of California found 64 percent saying that high speed rail is important for the future quality of life and economic vitality of California, but that drops to 48 percent when told the price tag.

“Public faith in this project is eroding,” admits Sean Jeans-Gill, vice president of policy at the Rail Passengers Association in Washington, D.C. Support is slipping among the state’s big-city mayors as well, says Schweitzer, as it becomes clear they won’t see a high speed train anytime soon.

State auditor issues ‘scathing’ report
Then a bombshell dropped in November 2018 when the California state auditor released its report on the High Speed Rail Authority.

“The auditor’s report was scathing,” Moore says. “There doesn’t appear to be any aspect of the project that was well executed.”

The report criticized CHSRA for starting construction in the Central Valley in 2013 before it had acquired land, determined how it would relocate utilities, or obtained agreements with stakeholders. A contractor was told to begin construction within Union Pacific’s right-of-way before an agreement with the freight railroad was finalized. These issues led to $600 million in cost overruns and another $1.6 billion in additional costs to complete construction.

The agency rushed to build because it was concerned about meeting deadlines for the $2.6 billion federal grant, says the auditor. CHSRA’s chief engineer also told auditors that the decision to begin construction “was partially driven by a desire to show visible progress as various groups were trying to stop the program.”

In addition, the auditor cited “weak and inconsistent oversight” of vendor contracts, even though the rail authority has 56 contract managers.

In its response, the agency concurred with the auditor’s recommendations and said that it was committed to “active management and continuous improvement of this most important program.”

Missing element: Trains
While Californians were originally promised a dedicated high-speed rail system, around 2012 the CHSRA began introducing plans to share trackage with existing rail operators in the San Francisco Peninsula and Los Angeles Basin, and to share a freight corridor between San Jose and Gilroy. While reducing construction costs, this blended approach will lower train speeds on shared trackage, reduce frequencies, and potentially introduce service delays.

But first, there need to be trains to run. None of the cost estimates include trainsets. Nor has a train operator been identified. And, under the constraints of Proposition 1A, the passenger service is required to operate with no subsidies. Schweitzer calls that provision “nuts.”

CHSRA expects to contract with a private, for-profit firm to operate and maintain the passenger service. It would be required to invest in and provide rolling stock, control, and signal systems. The agency projects operations from San Francisco to Bakersfield beginning in 2029, with first-year ridership of 4.3 to 7.6 million. It says that total revenue from fares and other income would cover operations and maintenance costs, “even in a pessimistic scenario.”

USC’s Moore doesn’t agree. “The cost of operations will be high enough that a high speed train will be out-competed by airlines and automobiles.”

Before anyone can operate a high speed train from Bakersfield to San Francisco, though, the line through the Central Valley has to be completed, and the Trump administration’s threat to subtract $3.5 billion from the rail authority’s coffers puts that at risk.

It should not have come as a surprise. The state auditor warned last year that it was a real possibility: “Missing the deadline could expose the State to the risk of having to pay back as much as $3.5 billion in federal funds.” The Government Accountability Office also determined in a legal opinion that the federal government could demand repayment, and could recover the funds, if necessary, by taking them out of any other payments from Washington to the state.

Missteps, miscommunication, and mismanagement may have brought the California high speed rail project to a crisis point. According to Schweitzer, “The project boosters were so in love with the technology that they didn’t really think about how to communicate the project or how to be straight with people about how costly a whole system would be, and how we really needed to find a dedicated funding source for it.”

18 thoughts on “Missteps lead California high speed rail to crisis NEWSWIRE

  1. Nowhere is the cost of doing nothing mentioned. $3.5 billion doesn’t go far for highway expansion or airport expansion anymore, either…

  2. William, It does not quite originate in either Bakersfield, or Merced. More like south of Wasco to north Madera.

  3. It’s about 165 miles between Bakersfield and Merced, not 119. Other than that, great article!

  4. Gosh , another political rant from Charles Landey. No wonder few bother commentating on these posts

  5. The ridership estimates were done by a firm called Cambridge Analytics, which are experts in this field. Again, if they are wrong no one will continue to hire them. To answer criticisms like yours the HSR Authority formed a pier review panel of experts in that field unconnected with the project the review their methodology and it was found to be sound and the results sound…..it was not pulled from their armpit. Will facts make no difference? What is the source of the 68 million? Even so it is feasible when full operation from LA to SF is in place because at that point, operations will likely be 11 trains per hour in each direction. The TGV in France carries over 110 million per year. Why is that not possible in CA when the population in 30 years will reach 50 million? You can’t compare this to Acela when they only run 1 or 2 trains an hour

  6. Steve Foster – Mike’s reasoning was kind of circular. What Mike said is that to come up with estimated ridership is this: We will assume 22 trains an hour and then assume people will show up to fill 22 trains.

  7. Mike Weyhrich,
    I find it hard to believe CA HSR can safely operate 11 very high speed trains in each direction per hour utilizing only 2 tracks for most of the trip, especially if there are stops along the way.
    Did Cambridge Analytics arrive at their findings using realistic assumptions or did they use a “perfect case” scenario or a scenario based upon the European experience? Is it possible they were just asked “what is the estimated annual maximum number of passengers that could be serviced by HSR” without considering any other factors? Was the cost of building and operating HSR in CA ever addressed in their findings?

  8. PAUL – Re: The Central Valley routing vs. the Coast Route. Here’s my point: if you blow your wad on HSR in one corridor, you can’t serve the other corridor because you’ve run out of money. If California is headed toward a Germany-like population (see a post below from Mike W.) they won’t all live strung out along one rail line. That’s thinking like an American — we will put the train here, rather than there, and 68 million people will flock to the chosen route because we said so with our hundred billion dollars. Never mind the people who live on the other side of the mountain.

    If you look at the successful rail systems – Germany, Netherlands, the UK, these aren’t “either-or” systems. They go where the people go – multiple corridors, multiple routes. “Either- Or” is American thought which is why our rail systems fall short.

    I was in York, England, headed toward a hotel in West Drayton (western London) near Heathrow Airport. (Think of it as a trip to Queens Borough in American terms). Thinking like an American, my inclination was I’d take the first train to Cambridge and London Kings Cross Station, make my way across London to Paddington Station, then out to West Drayton on a local.

    When I got to the York station, the next train to leave was on an entirely different route —- to Reading via Sheffield, Birmingham and Oxford. Wow, I thought, I can change to a local at Reading, this will get me to West Drayton from the opposite direction. Without changing stations as I would have in London.

    As it happened, the train to Reading ran into a series of delays so the trip was a schlep. But I had the right idea. Along the way I saw a lot of the UK’s Flyover Country I would have missed on the route via Cambridge.

  9. When someone says develop a plan to determine how much a system will cost, before even knowing how the system will work, the plan is destined to be a total failure. America hasn’t built a completely new railway in probably a hundred years. All the passenger car manufacturing cos have closed. All the Locomotive companies are struggling to stay afloat. To top that, state and federal governments are good at having ideas without having ways to pay for them. Take AOC’s plan to change to a totally green world with only the Fairy God Mother to pay for them!!! Add to the problem, this project is being being built in California, What else could possibly go wrong!!!!

  10. So now can we now look at 110 mph tilt train 12 round trips a day Sacramento-Oakland-San Jose-SLO-LA-San Diego? Almost zero freight train interference for most of that route. Pretty sure UPRR wouldn’t ask an arm and a leg for the Salinas-Oxnard segment. I doubt this would cost but a small fraction of the HSR disaster, as no tunneling would be required, not even electrification though that might be incrementally useful, just a lot more sidings and better class track.

    I’d sure ride it. I usually drive it since I moved out here and the traffic on all California interstate highways is unbelievably grueling and not just in the metros. Too grueling to even take in the excellent scenery if you’re behind the wheel. I’m going downtown to downtown anyway so I don’t want to deal with airport commutes, TSA lines and cramped coach seats so 4 hours SJ-LA would be just peachy.

  11. I don’t always agree with Mr. Landey but I think he’s mostly correct on this mess. I only wish he’d acknowledge the rather massive “industrial policy” subsidies that exist for roads (especially for freight trucking and miles and miles of suburban sprawl development and airports and airport roads and air traffic control) that make it a challenge indeed for rail to achieve $68M in farebox revenue.

    But back to the CHSRA debacle: it never should’ve stipulated 2:40, never should’ve been routed through the Central Valley and instead should have run along the west valley where I-5 runs. That’d have been a shorter route with immensely lower land aquisition and utility relo costs and no other railroad and not many other major roads even to extensively interact with. This would’ve made reasonable LA-SF trip times even with the “blended approach” on each end (about the only smart decision I’ve seen in the history of this project). And all without the much more expensive trackage precision and land eating radius of curvature requirements needed to maintain the unrealistic schedule through the roundabout and station stop ridden Central Valley, whose residents never wanted the train in the first place.

    This still would’ve required the very expensive tunneling to get into the LA basin and into the Santa Clara Valley. So it was never going to be easy or fast or cheap, and rather than concealing or eliding that fact, the pols should’ve been straight with the voter (few are regardless of party) and made fair and accurate comparisons with subsidized spending for other modes.

    Please indulge a fantasy here: Maybe they should’ve dreamt big on the southern tunnels and developed a PPP that would’ve built a multitrack set of tubes through the Tehachapis that would accommodate the HSR, Amtrak California from Bakersfield to give direct service form the Central Valley to LA, and UP intermodal freight on the otherwise apparently not very truck competitive I-5 Corridor.

  12. MIKE W. Trip generation? It’s always a guessing game, and I’ve seen people guess wrong. Like highway planners in here in Wisconsin who projected growth that didn’t happen. So they guessed wrong but they didn’t just pull a number out of their armpit like California HSR did.

    Mike let’s look at the number. There’s one hard number out there, not a guess, not a projection, but a real number. That number is Amtrak. Amtrak does 30 to 35 million a year, quite steady. That’s Maine to San Diego, Dallas to Toronto, Miami to Vancouver. That includes all the California corridors which I consider raging successes. Add all of Amtrak together, including the successful Hiawatha, the enormously successful California corridors, the laudable growth in Virginia, the sold-out transcons, the slow growth in the showpiece NEC, that comes up to 30 to 35 million. So we are supposed to believe California could do 68 million? MIKE W, wake up and smell the coffee.

    GERALD – “… the land could just be taken for the project, that would save billions.” Yes, that’s how they do it in North Korea and once did it in nazzie Germany. Gerald, read the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution. Not even California is that far out of there.

    GERALD – Germany has high-speed trains because they have actual, functional, brilliant people planning and building them. California has a bunch of grifters and liars and con artists. The previous governor was a decent and thoughtful man who lost his way on HSR and other environmental and economic issues. The current governor is a flim-flam political hack talking out of both sides of his mouth on HSR. I hope Trump sues California and I hope he wins.

  13. Only in China is the speed of construction for high speed rail can be considered fast. High speed rail construction elsewhere is slow taking years to decades to complete. California’s problem is over promising and overspending to attain impractical short construction times.

  14. So, when it’s been done in Japan, France and China…but couldn’t be done here…because…we didn’t want to lose control to a foreign country…otherwise it would be farther along now. Also, someone forgot to add the provision that land could just be taken for the project, that would save billions.

  15. And people in other countries wonder why the USofA doesn’t have high speed trains. This one of the rare times that I agree with the president that our trains go chug, chug!

  16. For a forum on a “Trains” magazine web site, the constant commentators seem to be the most anti passenger train people around. Also, the writer of the post above seems to quote the most harsh critics without really addressing what is being done now to address the “problems”. My feeling is that Dan Z was a bit “lazy” in throwing this piece together. Point in case, he notes that there is no train operator identified. Has he even researched the HSR authority web site that notes that Deutsches Bahn as the early train operator hired to consult on equipment and operations. The info from the web site notes that if both parties are satisfied with the progress of the contract then DB would become the operator. Did Dan research to note that the HSR authority had been addressing the concerns of the State Auditor even before the report came out and the major issues noted were ones that the HSR authority had noted in their 2018 Business Plan as issues or decisions that would not be repeated. Also Dan Z tends to quote academics as critics, and there have been several, but it is easy to be critical of decisions when come from a standpoint of a “perfect world”. Having been involved in construction projects I can say that there is no “perfect world” and you make decisions based on the constraints presented to you, which is usually not a “perfect” world. And to Charles below, I have met a few of the people on the HSR authority and they are not “liars” or “stupid people” as you claim. The trip generation info was prepared by a private consultancy whose business is doing that work, meaning if you get it wrong, you don’t get hired again.

  17. I donno, seems the consultants made out pretty good on this one. Isn’t that what military spending is for: looting the government? Seems like they should have called it the “Defense and Speeding Freedum-n-Democracy HSR system” then they could have spent all the loot they wanted.

  18. “Missteps, Miscommunication and mismanagement..” As if all of that wasn’t foreseen. Foreseen by those much maligned Republicans. Yeah, the Republicans got it right. In my house, even my cat Burlington is a Republican. (He’s a lot smarter than he seems to be.)

    To that add (1) outright lies (2) total stupidity (3) misunderstanding about the basics truths of trip generation populations (4) a projection of trains covering their operating cost being an out-and-out fantasy – or an out-and-out lie. And (5) amateur socialists trying to build a $100 billion dollar business.

    In the highway business, an overrun of 20% is an outright scandal. In the HSR business, a nine billion dollar contract now coming in (or not coming in) at ten times the price or more, is business as usual.

    I’m all for trains. California has done a gorgeous job with its incremental improvements both to Amtrak and its various commuter authorities. There aren’t glowing words enough in my vocabulary sufficient to praise the Coaster, the Santa Barbara trains, the Capitol trains, the San Joaquins. This HSR fantasy has taken all that good stuff and thrown it in the trash.

    Environmentalism my cat Burlington’s ar$e. Try, total waste of money, resources and energy.

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